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THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT
ACT: A REVIEW OF THE LAW AND THE
COURT'S INTERPRETATION
NEIL A. BENCHELLt
I.
INTRODUCTION
A. Programmer Arrested
On July 16, 2001, Dmitry Skylarov, a 26-year-old Russian com-
puter programmer, was arrested and charged with one count of con-
spiracy to traffic in technology designed to circumvent copyright
technology and multiple counts of trafficking in circumvention tech-
nology,1 for which he could have received 25 years in prison. He was
arrested just as he was about to give a talk describing the weaknesses
of Adobe Systems, Inc.'s electronic book software. 2 Mr. Skylarov's
crime was authoring a computer program that alters the restrictions a
publisher may place on a file formatted for Adobe eBook reader.3
After eleven days in a Las Vegas jail, Mr. Skylarov was trans-
ferred, in handcuffs and shackles, to a federal prison in Oklahoma and
then to a facility in San Jose, California, where he was given the op-
portunity to post a $50,000 bail. 4 He was released on August 6, 2001,
but not allowed to return to his family in Russia. Five months later,
Mr. Skylarov entered into an agreement with prosecutors dropping all
charges against him if he testified against his employer. In December
2002, a federal jury acquitted Skylarov's employer of any
wrongdoing. 5
t After an eighteen year career in the computer technology field, Mr. Benchell now
practices law in the areas of intellectual property and technology law. Special thanks are
due to Dr. Jill Weissberg-Benchell, Ph.D., for her guidance, patience, editing and
encouragement.
1 Indictment at 3-6, United States of America v. Elcom LTD., available at http://www.
eff.org/IP/DMCAIUS-v_Elcomsoft/20010828_sklyarovelcomsoft-indictment.pdf.
2 Lawrence Lessig, Jail Time in the Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2001, at A17.
3 Id.
4 Steven Levy, Busted by the Copyright Cops, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 2001, at 54.
5 Matt Richtel, Russian Company Acquitted of Digital Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, December
18, 2002, at C4.
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B. Princeton University Professor Threatened Not to Deliver Paper
Princeton University Professor Edward Felten cancelled plans to
deliver a research paper in April 2001 after he received a letter threat-
ening a lawsuit if he presented his work, which was in direct response
to a challenge issued by the Secure Digital Music Initiative
("SDMI"). 6 The SDMI developed a system to protect the copyrights
of digital recordings for the music recording industry. The challenge
was an attempt to prove their copyright protection mechanism was
foolproof;7 however, Professor Felten's team discovered ways to cir-
cumvent the security system. Professor Felten was planning to deliver
a paper on his research when he received a letter from the Recording
Industry Association of America ("RIAA") threatening a lawsuit if
the paper was presented and instructing Professor Felten to destroy
any workshop materials and avoid publicly discussing his research. 8
On June 6, 2001, Professor Felten filed a complaint for declara-
tory judgment and injunctive relief against the RIAA and others. Af-
ter Professor Felten met with the defendants and representatives of
the recording industry, the RIAA no longer objected to Professor
Felten's paper; nevertheless, Professor Felten chose to continue with
his lawsuit. On November 28, 2001, the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey held there was no justiciable issue, since
the defendants no longer objected to the paper being presented. 9 Pro-
fessor Felten has since received assurances from the recording indus-
try that his team will not be sued and so has decided not to appeal his
case. Professor Felten ultimately published his paper on August 15,
2001.10
6 Hackers Threatened With Lawsuit, CBSNews.com, April 26, 2001, at http://www.cb-
snews.com/stories/2001/04/26/archive/technology/main287923.shtml.
7 Scott Craver, Bede Liu, Patrick McGregor, Adam Stubblefield, Ben Swartzlander,
Dan S. Wallach, Min Wu, SDMI Challenge FAQ, at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/sdmi/
faq.html.
8 RIAA/SDMI Legal Threat Letter (April 9, 2001) (letter from Matthew J. Oppen-
heim, Esq., Senior Vice President of Business and Legal Affairs, Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America, to Professor Edward Felten, Department of Computer Science,
Princeton University), at http://www.eff.org/sc/felten/20010409 riaa-sdmi letter.html.
9 Felten v. Recording Industry Association of America, No. 01 CV 2669 (D.N.J. No-
vember 28, 2001) (transcript of motions to dismiss) at 30, at http://www.eff.org/sc/felten/
20011128_hearingtranscript.pdf.
10 Scott A. Craver, Min Wu, Bede Liu, Adam Stubblefield, Ben Swartzlander, Dan W.
Wallach, Drew Dean, and Edward W. Felten, Reading Between the Lines: Lessons from the
SDMA Challenge, 10th USENIX Security Symposium (August 2001) at http://www.usenix.
org/events/secOl/craver.pdf.
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C. America Online Cleared of Copyright Infringement
America Online Inc. ("AOL") is the world's leader in interactive
services and Internet access. One service AOL provides is access to
the USENET, a collection of organizations whose computers connect
with each other in order to exchange messages on various topics or
"newsgroups."' 1 When a new message is posted to a USENET new-
sgroup, all of the computers connected to the USENET receive a copy
of the message.
In Harlan Ellison v. Stephen Robertson, et. al., AOL was accused
of copyright infringement because Mr. Ellison's copyrighted stories
were stored on AOL's USENET server. Mr. Robertson originally
posted the stories on a server not affiliated with AOL, but the stories
were transmitted to AOL through the USENET.12 Even though the
court felt AOL had constructive knowledge of the infringing material
and therefore materially contributed to the infringement, 13 the court
granted AOL's motion for summary judgment.14
D. The DMCA
Each of these cases appears to be substantially different, yet they
all have one common thread-the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
of 1998 ("DMCA" or "Act"). 15 The DMCA was ostensibly a reaction
to the increase in digital copyrighted material and the resulting explo-
sion in pirating of this new medium. The Act essentially consists of
two distinct parts. Title I, entitled 'WIPO Treaties Implementation, 16
addresses the problem of ensuring the integrity of copyrighted works
in a digital format by criminalizing the circumvention of measures
meant to protect digital works. 17 Title II - Online Copyright Infringe-
ment Liability Limitation - limits an Internet Service Provider's
("ISP") liability for transmitting or maintaining copyrighted material
by codifying much of the case law dealing with ISPs and service pro-
vider liability. 18
This article will briefly review the pertinent sections of the copy-
right law affected by Titles I and II of the DMCA and consider the
significant case law involving the Act since it was enacted. Finally, the
article will provide a direction for the future of the DMCA.
11 Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F.Supp. 2d 1051, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
12 Id. at 1054.
13 Id. at 1060.
14 Id. at 1072.
15 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
16 See H.R. REP. No. 150-551, pt. 1, at 9.
17 See id. at 10.
18 See id.
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II.
17 U.S.C. § 1201 - 1205 - ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION
A. The Statute
By far the most controversial piece of the DMCA is the anti-cir-
cumvention provisions of Title I. Under 17 U.S.C. § 1201, a person
who circumvents or traffics in products meant to circumvent an access
control measure used to protect a copyrighted work will be in viola-
tion of the DMCA. 19 An example of an access control measure might
be encryption technology, where a person wanting access to an en-
crypted work would need a key to decrypt the work before using it. In
this case, the unauthorized use of a product that decrypts the copy-
righted work or the trafficking of such a product is illegal.
A number of high profile cases have already dealt with the public
disclosure of methods to circumvent access control technologies. 20 In
these cases, violators of the DMCA have found ways to circumvent
the protection mechanisms applied to the digital works. Under the
DMCA, the public release of this information is considered trafficking
in circumvention technology and is illegal.
The statute has a limited number of fair use exceptions to the
anti-circumvention provisions. Circumvention of access control tech-
nology for a computer program is lawful for the strict purpose of cre-
ating interoperability between the protected work and independently
created programs.21 Likewise, the circumvention of copyright protec-
tion technology is allowed for encryption research.22 However, both
of these sections require the party to have acquired the work lawfully
and in good faith. There are additional exceptions for certain entities,
such as nonprofit libraries and educational institutions, where posses-
sion of circumvented materials are allowed in determining whether to
acquire the work.23 This creates an interesting conundrum in that it is
illegal for an institution to remove copyright protections from a work,
but permissible to obtain works where the technological protections
were illegally removed. The government may also violate the DMCA
with impunity for lawfully authorized investigative activities of a gov-
ernment agent.24
The anti-circumvention provisions are punishable by both civil
and criminal penalties. Section 1203 assesses civil remedies for a vio-
19 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2003).
20 One such example is discussed below in Universal v. Corley. Another example is the
case of Professor Felten, which was discussed at the beginning of this paper.
21 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
22 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g).
23 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d).
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e); H.R. REP. No. 105-551 pt. II at 42.
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lation of the anti-circumvention provisions including temporary or
permanent injunctions and either actual or statutory damages ranging
from $200 to $25,000 per violation, plus attorney's fees. 25 Treble dam-
ages may also be awarded for repeat violations. 26 In addition, any
person willfully violating the anti-circumvention provisions for com-
mercial advantage or private gain is open to criminal liability under 17
U.S.C. § 1204. The punishment under these provisions includes up to
$500,000 in fines and five years imprisonment for the first offense, and
up to $1,000,000 in fines and 10 years imprisonment for each subse-
quent offense. 27
B. The Anti-Circumvention Provisions in Practice
The reported cases to date regarding the anti-circumvention pro-
visions of the DMCA have all been civil infringement cases and not
criminal. 28 RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc.29 was one of the first
cases to charge copyright infringement under the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA. Although this case only went to the prelim-
inary injunction stage, it provides a good example of how the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA are being used and inter-
preted by the courts. 30
RealNetworks, Inc. develops software products for sending mul-
timedia content over the Internet through a process called stream-
ing.31 In the streaming process, the server software, or RealServer,
initiates a handshake - a request to acknowledge that it is communi-
cating with receiving software, the RealPlayer - in order to authenti-
cate that both components are RealNetworks products. Once the
handshake is established, the content is sent in an encrypted format.
One of the attractive features of RealNetworks's products is the abil-
ity to restrict whether a user can save the content, by setting a switch
25 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3)
26 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(4).
27 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a).
28 The case against Dmitry Skylarov was a criminal indictment, but since the case set-
tled, there were no pertinent substantive rulings. The decision in Mr. Skylarov's em-
ployer's case has not been reported. In another DMCA case, Mohsin Mynaf pled guilty to
charges of violating the DMCA on March 28, 2002. California Video Bootlegger Pleads
Guilty in Rare Case, BUSINESs RECORDER, March 30, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
Group File.
29 RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889,
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
30 RealNetworks and Streambox entered into an out-of-court settlement. See Jim Hu,
RealNetworks Settles Lawsuit with Streambox, CNET News.com, Sept. 8, 2000 at http://
news.com.com/2100-1023-245482.html.
31 RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *3 (Multimedia content is audio,
video, and a combination of audio and video).
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on the streaming file called the "Copy Switch". 32 In addition to con-
tent-providing software, RealNetworks offers a search engine that
looks for audio and video clips on the Internet. The search capability
is supplied through a contract with Snap! LLC.33
Streambox also develops software for providing multimedia con-
tent over the Internet. Steambox's VCR product has the capability of
accessing and making copies of RealNetworks's streaming files by em-
ulating RealNetworks's handshake protocol.34 Once the handshake is
established, VCR ignores the Copy Switch on the streaming file.35
The court paraphrased the three prong test articulated by the
DMCA to determine which products violate the act: (i) primarily de-
signed to circumvent copyright protections, (ii) limited commercially
significant purposes other than circumvention, and (iii) marketed as a
means for circumvention. 36 In granting RealNetworks a preliminary
injunction, the court found that RealNetworks's handshake and Copy
Switch constitute technological measures that control access to copy-
righted works37 and that Streambox VCR violated the DMCA as a
circumvention tool.38 The court said that VCR is a product designed
to circumvent RealNetworks's copyright protection technologies with
no other significant commercial value. Steambox's argument that
VCR allows users to create "fair use" copies was rejected by the court,
because, unlike the case in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,39 the
owners of copyrighted works have taken affirmative actions to pre-
vent people from copying their works, and VCR is circumventing
those actions.40
In this case, the court interpreted "technological measures" as ap-
plying directly to the digital work - Copy Switch - and to procedures
for accessing the digital work in a secured environment, such as
RealNetworks's handshake protocol. Broadening the definition to in-
clude mechanisms not directly applied to the work creates an addi-
32 Id. at *6.
33 Id. at *9
34 Id. at *10.
35 Id. at *11 (There was also an allegation about Streambox's Ripper and Ferret prod-
ucts. Ripper can convert a file from RealNetworks format into something else. The court
found that since the file had to already be on the user's computer and Ripper had a com-
mercially legitimate purpose, it did not infringe Realnetworks's copyrights. Ferret is a
"plug-in" application that alters RealPlayer to allow access to Streambox's search engines.
The court found that since it altered RealPlayer, Ferret created a derivative work of Real-
Player in violation of Realnetworks's copyright).
36 RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *18 (paraphrasing 17 U.S.C. §1201).
37 Id. at *19.
38 Id. at *20.
39 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
40 RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *22-23.
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tional control over the copyright monopoly granted by the
Constitution and further threatens the constitutional rights of a non-
copyright owner's access to such works.
C. Constitutional Challenge to the DMCA
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Eric Corley,41 the issue was the
protection of video distributed in Digital Versatile Disk ("DVD") for-
mat. When the motion picture studios began distributing films on
DVD, the files were encrypted using a process called Content Scram-
ble System ("CSS"). In order to view a CSS-encrypted DVD, a player
- either a DVD player or computer with a DVD drive - must be
programmed to decrypt the code, although the decryption process
does not allow the user to copy the film. In 1999, a Norwegian teen-
ager collaborated with two other people who have remained anony-
mous to create DeCSS, a program that decrypts the DVD code.42
Originally created for computers running non-Microsoft operating
systems, DeCSS also allows viewing and copying of DVD files from
Windows based computers.43
Eight motion picture studios filed the original complaint against
Shawn Reimerdes, Eric Corley and Roman Kazan, (Reimerdes and
Kazan entered into consent decrees, leaving Corley as the sole defen-
dant44) alleging the defendants listed the program instructions - also
called code - on their web sites, making DeCSS available to anyone
on the Internet.45 Corley is the owner of 2600 Enterprises, Inc., which
publishes a magazine called 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, 46 which was
subsequently added as a defendant. 47 In November 1999, Corley
wrote an article about DeCSS and placed the article, with the DeCSS
41 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (also referred to as
Universal II).
42 Initially, it was understood that the teenager, Jon Johansen, was the creator of the
program; however, Johansen has since stated that one of the other people he was collabo-
rating with actually wrote it. Johansen has also said that the two other people have re-
mained anonymous because they are adults and work in the computer industry. J.S. Kelly,
Interview with Jon Johansen, Linuxworld, at http://www.linuxworld.com/linuxworld/lw-
2000-01/lw-01-dvd-interview.html. In January, 2003, a Norwegian judge acquitted Johansen
on digital piracy charges. Dan Gillmor, Cartel's Copyright Control Loosening, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2003, at 1F.
43 An operating system is the base program run on a computer. Most people are famil-
iar with Microsoft's Windows operating systems. Non-Microsoft operating systems include
Linux, Mac OS and UNIX.
44 Universal v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 312, n.91 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
45 Id. at 303.
46 2600: THE HACKER QUARTERLY is a magazine designed for computer hackers. For
more information on the magazine and the origin of its name see Universal 1I, 273 F.3d at
435-436.
47 Universal, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
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code, on the magazine's web site.48 The district court enjoined Corley
from listing the code and from hyperlinking 49 to other web sites that
maintain copies of the code.50 On appeal, Corley challenged the con-
stitutionality of the DMCA on Copyright Clause and First Amend-
ment grounds.
Under the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, copyright pro-
tection is limited in time before it enters the public domain.51 Since
the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA would continue to
protect a work after the copyright monopoly on a digital work has
expired, the DMCA unconstitutionally confers a perpetual copyright
grant.52 The court rejected this argument as being premature and
speculative because the copyright monopoly of protected digital
works has yet to expire. 53
Corley also argued that computer code is speech and, as such, is
protected by the First Amendment. The court first considered
whether computer code could be protected speech and found,
"[i]nstructions that communicate information comprehensible to a
human qualify as speech whether the instructions are designed for ex-
ecution by computer or human (or both). ' 54 But the court also stated
that computer programs have a speech component - the information
conveyed to a human - and a non-speech component - the informa-
tion the computer uses to execute the program. It is the latter, the
non-speech component, that the DMCA is concerned with, and thus,
the DMCA is content-neutral as relates to the First Amendment. 55 A
content-neutral restriction is permissible if it serves a substantial gov-
ernmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression and
48 Universal II, 273 F.3d at 439.
49 See id. at 436. "A hyperlink is a cross-reference (in a distinctive font or color) ap-
pearing on one web page that, when activated by the point-and-click of a mouse, brings
onto the computer screen another web page," Id. at 455.
50 Id. at 441; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
51 See U. S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
52 See Universal II. There are actually two components to this argument. First, since
technologies that prevent access to the works cannot be disabled, there is a restriction on a
work's fair use. Second, as Corley argues, the use of such technologies grants a copyright
owner perpetual protection, not a limited protection as contemplated by the Constitution;
see e.g., John R. Therien, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward Pre-
serving Fair Use and the Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979
(2001); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 673 (2000).
53 See Universal II, 273 F.3d at 445; but see United States of America v. Elcomsoft, 203
F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1141 (N.D.Cal. 2002)(finding the DMCA does not unconstitutionally
prevent the work from entering the public domain).
54 Id. at 448.
55 See id. at 454.
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does not substantially burden more speech than necessary. 56 Ulti-
mately, the court held the injunction restricting the posting of the
DeCSS code was constitutional because the government's interest in
preventing unauthorized access to encrypted works is "unquestionably
substantial," and the injunction plainly served that interest. In addi-
tion, the injunction is unrelated to the suppression of free speech and
since a less restrictive way to curb the distribution of the non-speech
component of the DeCSS code was not available, the injunction did
not substantially burden free speech more than necessary.57 The court
applied the same analysis in deciding that the restriction on hyperlink-
ing to DeCSS code on other web sites was also constitutional.
In finding as it did, the court established, for the first time, the
constitutionality of the DMCA. It also created a tension between the
constitutional rights of the copyright owners and the constitutional
freedoms of non-copyright owners. The Supreme Court will ulti-
mately be placed in the position of determining the DMCA's
constitutionality.
III.
17 U.S.C. § 512 - ISP SAFE HARBOR
A. The Statute
An Internet Service Provider ("ISP") supplies access to the In-
ternet and provides other related services.58 Prior to the DMCA, it
was unclear what liability an ISP had for copyright infringement
caused by one of its customers. The DMCA codifies the existing case
law by offering a safe harbor for ISPs and limiting liability to certain
circumstances. 59 Under this section of the DMCA, parties are pro-
tected from liability against monetary and injunctive relief if they can
be classified as a service provider and they follow specific steps to
remove the infringing material. 60
A service provider is defined as:
An entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connec-
tions for digital online communications, between or among points
specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modi-
fication to the content of the material as sent or received. 61
56 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
57 See Universal II, 273 F.3d at 454-455.
58 Webopedia, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/ISP.html (last visited on Oct. 24,
2001).
59 See H.R. REP. No. 150-551, pt. 1, at 11.
60 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
61 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A).
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Section 512(k) further defines a service provider as one who pro-
vides "online services or network access."' 62 It is important to note
that in order to be shielded under the DMCA, a service provider must
offer their services without modifying the materials. Service providers
must also provide a stated policy for termination of repeat infringers
to maintain their protection under the DMCA. 63
A service provider can limit its liability for three modes of storing
infringing material under the DMCA: 1) transitory communications,
2) material coming from outside the ISP's control and temporarily
cached on the ISP's system, and 3) material stored by one of the ISP's
users.64 Transitory communications are those communications that
are transmitted from the Internet and routed through a service pro-
vider's systems.65 This typically occurs when data, such as email, is
communicated through a service provider to another user on the In-
ternet. In this case, the service provider does not save this data on its
systems. Temporarily caching data is an automatic technical process
that occurs when an outside user sends data to one of the service pro-
vider's users, such as when a user from another service provider sends
an email to the service provider's user. The data would be tempora-
rily stored on the service provider's systems until the receiving user
decides to remove it.66 Here, the service provider's user does not cre-
ate the offending data. Rather, the data comes from an outside
source.67 Material stored by a service provider's user occurs when a
service provider's user stores copyrighted material on the service pro-
vider's systems. This typically occurs when a service provider hosts a
web site for the user. The DMCA would protect the service provider
from liability for copyright infringement. However, the service pro-
vider would have to take extreme measures to remove the offending
material.
The service provider must satisfy three requirements to claim
protection from liability for storing infringing material. First the ser-
vice provider can have no actual or constructive knowledge of the in-
fringing activity and must act expeditiously to remove the material
once it is aware of the infringement. 68 Second, the service provider
cannot receive any "financial benefit directly attributable to the in-
62 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
64 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a-c).
65 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
66 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1).
67 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E).
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i-iii).
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fringing activity. ' 69 Finally, the service provider must promptly re-
move or disable access to the offending material once it receives
notice of copyright infringement.70 The elements of the notice must
be in the manner prescribed by the statute 71 and sent to a designated
agent of the service provider.72
Linking or directing users to areas with infringing material is also
considered infringing activity.7 3 If a service provider's user creates a
web site directing people to infringing material, the service provider
may be liable for infringement. To avoid liability, the service provider
must act upon the links in the same way offending material on the
service provider's systems is addressed.74
The statute also protects the service provider against liability for
two other forms of infringement. First, if the service provider is an
institution of higher learning, the service provider cannot be held fi-
nancially liable for any activity considered fair use.75 The other safe
harbor is for liability from the service provider's own user if the ser-
vice provider is forced to remove or disable access to claimed infring-
ing material (called "taking down"). 76 The removal of material must
have been in good faith, and the service provider must have notified
the user of the take down.77 The service provider is also responsible
for forwarding any counter notice from the user to the party alleging
infringement.78
The courts have consistently been challenged by this title of the
DMCA in two areas: the definition of a service provider and what is
sufficient for notice of copyright infringement. The following cases
illustrate the arguments made on both sides of these issues.
B. Qualifying Under the Safe Harbor Provisions of DMCA
Since the enactment of the DMCA in 1998, a number of cases
have shaped the interpretation of the statute's safe harbor provisions.
In Costar Group v. LoopNet, Inc.,79 Costar, a national supplier of real
estate information services, alleged that LoopNet, an online broker-
age service, was displaying Costar's copyrighted photographs on its
69 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
70 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
71 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C)(3).
72 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C)(2).
73 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. II, at 56.
74 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
75 17 U.S.C. § 512(e).
76 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001).
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web site. Costar claimed that over 300 of the pictures on LoopNet's
site were copyrighted by Costar and were being infringed. In its de-
fense, LoopNet invoked the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA
claiming to be an online service provider.80 Costar argued LoopNet
cannot claim safe harbor because the photographs were reviewed and
stored on the web site at LoopNet's direction, LoopNet has no termi-
nation policy in place, LoopNet obtained a direct financial benefit
from the photographs and LoopNet did not act expeditiously to re-
move the infringing material.81
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court considered
whether LoopNet could be shielded by the DMCA safe harbor provi-
sions, and agreed that, under the DMCA, LoopNet is a "provider of
online services" eligible for safe harbor protection.82 Since LoopNet
only reviewed the pictures to ensure they were commercial properties,
not to assess whether they might be obviously infringing material, it
was up to the users of the system to direct the storing and displaying
of the photographs. 83 LoopNet did not challenge the sufficiency of
the notice provided by Costar, so the court found LoopNet had
knowledge of the infringement resulting from Costar's notice,8 4 but
the court agreed with LoopNet's argument that it did not derive a
financial benefit from the specific infringement given that LoopNet
did not receive an additional benefit for showing the pictures. 85 The
court had concerns about the sufficiency of LoopNet's termination
policy for repeat offenders and its "take down" policy.86 On this
point, the court said that there were several issues of material fact, so
the parties were not entitled to summary judgment.
In sum, the court denied summary judgment on the issue of
whether LoopNet was entitled to safe harbor under the DMCA since
there was still an issue of material fact about whether LoopNet's ter-
mination and take down policies were sufficient. However, the court
did consider LoopNet a service provider under the DMCA even
though LoopNet was not an uninterested party, such as an ISP.
C. Sufficiency of Notice
In ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., the court was asked to
determine what constitutes a sufficient notice of infringement before
80 Id. at 692.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 701.
83 Id. at 702.
84 Id. at 703.
85 Id. at 705.
86 Id. at 704.
Fall 20031
42 BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:30
an ISP is deprived of safe harbor protection.87 ALS Scan creates and
markets copyrighted "adult" photographs.88 ALS Scan determined
that RemarQ, an ISP, had hundreds of ALS Scan's pictures grouped
into two "newsgroups" - alt.als and alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.als. 89
ALS Scan contends these two newsgroups were created solely for the
purpose of distributing ALS Scan's pictures. 90 ALS Scan sent a cease
and desist letter to RemarQ naming the two newsgroups containing
infringing material, although ALS Scan did not list the specific images
of concern. 91 RemarQ refused ALS Scan's demand, stating the in-
fringing material was not identified with sufficient specificity. 92
ALS Scan sued RemarQ for copyright infringement and for vio-
lating Title II of the DMCA.93 The DMCA charge was related to
RemarQ's failure to expeditiously remove the infringing material
once it had notice of its existence. In its defense, RemarQ claims ALS
Scan failed to identify the infringing material in compliance with 17
U.S.C. § 512 (c)(3)(A)(iii) because ALS Scan never provided it with
the identity of the infringing pictures. 94 The court held that ALS Scan
had substantially complied with the notice requirement even though it
did not give every element of the notice,95 thereby denying RemarQ
its safe harbor defense.
D. Broad Definition of Service Provider/Proper Notice
In Costar, the court used a broad interpretation of the term "ser-
vice provider" when it declared Loopnet was a service provider under
the DMCA. At virtually the same time, the court in Hendrickson v.
eBay, Inc., et. al,.96 was likewise employing a broad definition of ser-
vice provider when applied to eBay. However, unlike the court in
ALS Scan, the Hendrickson court did not find the incomplete notice
of infringement to be substantially compliant with the Act.
eBay is an online auction service which allows users to list de-
scriptions of items they offer for sale. Hendrickson sent a letter, pro
se, advising eBay that he was the copyright owner of a documentary
called "Manson," and that pirated copies of the film were being of-
87 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619-20 (4th Cir. 2001).
88 Id. at 620.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 621. Similar letters were sent to AOL, Erol's, Mindspring and others, each
of which complied with the letter.
92 See id.
93 Title II of the DMCA is codified as 17 U.S.C. § 512.
94 ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 622.
95 Id. at 624.
96 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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fered on eBay's web site. The letter demanded that eBay cease and
desist from any conduct considered infringing. eBay's requests for ad-
ditional information on Hendrickson's copyrights and the identifica-
tion of specific infringing material were ignored prior to Hendrickson
filing suit.97
Before addressing the issue of whether eBay could be held liable
for copyright infringement, the court had to determine if the DMCA
safe harbor provisions applied to eBay. Consistent with the court's
finding in Costar, this court found that eBay was a service provider
under the DMCA since it was providing an online service in the form
of an online auction site. 98
Ultimately, the court found that Hendrickson's notification did
not comply with the DMCA's notice requirements in two ways. First,
even though Hendrickson identified himself as the copyright owner of
the documentary "Manson," the court was troubled that there was no
written statement, under penalty of perjury, attesting to the fact that
the information in the notification was accurate pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(vi). 99 Second, since Hendrickson did not give the spe-
cific item numbers of the infringing materials, the court felt his identi-
fication of the items was inadequate. The court did acknowledge that
there would be instances where this amount of specificity would not
be needed but did not believe this was such a situation, a result con-
trary to that in ALS Scan. Thus, the court decided eBay was a service
provider under the DMCA, but Hendrickson's notification regarding
pirated copies of "Manson" was insufficient, so eBay was entitled to
safe harbor protection. 10
E. Safe Harbor Conclusion
The cases interpreting the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA
have construed the statute broadly albeit, at times, inconsistently. It is
clear that Congress anticipated an ISP offering access to the Internet
to be a service provider under the DMCA. However, the courts have
broadened the statute to include organizations offering any type of
online service. On the other hand, the courts have been inconsistent
about interpreting the notification requirements of the DMCA. The
conflicting outcomes of ALS Scan and eBay demonstrate that more
guidance is needed before parties will know what constitutes an ac-
ceptable notice of copyright infringement.
97 See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1084-1085.
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).
99 See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
100 See id. at 1090.
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IV.
WHERE DOES THE DMCA Go FROM HERE?
Since its inception, questions regarding the constitutionality and
equity of the DMCA have been raised. Upon enactment of the stat-
ute, the implementation of the DMCA, at times, has been unbalanced
and controversial. The complaints have been heard on Capital Hill
where, in January 2002, U.S. Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA.) announced
he would introduce legislation late in 2002 to narrow the anti-circum-
vention provisions of the DMCA.101 Stating that "the fair use doctrine
is threatened today as never before, ' 10 2 Rep. Boucher reintroduced
the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act ("DMCRA") 10 3 on January
7, 2003 after having introduced it at the end of the 107th session of
Congress. Cosponsored with John Doolittle (R-CA), Spencer Bachus
(R-AL) and Patrick Kennedy (D-RI), the DMCRA seeks to reduce
the restrictions on copyright fair use that the DMCA created.
Unfortunately, Rep. Boucher and his cosponsors stand virtually
alone among their colleagues in the belief that the DMCA needs
changing. Can the DMCA be amended so that it can equitably pro-
tect the rights of copyright owners while still allowing non-copyright
owners access to fair use and public domain copyrighted materials?
And can this be done without the harsh threat of criminal sanctions?
A. Title I - Anti-circumvention
Although the stated purpose of Title I was to bring the United
States in compliance with two WIPO treaties, this simple description
does not begin to illustrate how it affects copyright law in the digital
age. The Supreme Court will ultimately determine the constitutional-
ity of the DMCA, but it appears that the DMCA is in conflict with the
Constitution on a number of points. First, the grant of a copyright
monopoly was never intended to be perpetual. The Framers of the
Constitution only intended artists to have exclusive rights to their
works for a limited time. If a work is encrypted with a copyright pro-
tection measure, that work is effectively protected forever. Under the
DMCA, it is possible for someone to take public domain material,
combine it with protected material in a digital format, apply a protec-
tion measure to the medium and effectively lock the public domain
material indefinitely. Attempting to circumvent the protection mea-
101 See Rick Boucher, Time to Rewrite the DMCA, at http://www.news.com/2010-1071-
825335.html, Jan. 29, 2002.
102 Press Release, Rep. Rick Boucher, Lawmakers Urge Protection of Fair Use Digital
Media Consumers' Rights Act Re-Introduced (January 7, 2003).
103 H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003).
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sures applied to the public domain material would be a violation of
the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. Second, the DMCA
does not allow the disclosure of methods of circumvention. As was
argued in Universal v. Corley, this has potential First Amendment
ramifications. The court in Universal stated that disclosing computer
code could be considered protected speech, but still restricted its pub-
lication. The Supreme Court will undoubtedly decide the constitu-
tionality of the DMCA, but until then there will always be a specter of
invalidity associated with the act.
The implementation of criminal sanctions against a violator of the
DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions seems incomprehensible to
many. The impact of this act was not understood until the arrest of
Dmitry Skylarov. The fact that a computer programmer from another
country could be arrested for writing a commercially available pro-
gram in his own country sends a shiver down the collective spine of all
people working in the digital industry. Although it is arguable
whether Mr. Skylarov intended his product to be used to circumvent
copyright protections, he spent months in jail for conducting a legal
activity in his own country. In this case, the punishment seems to be
cruel and unusual compared to the crime. And yet, Mr. Skylarov
knows better than anyone how the DMCA can be used to punish.
Along similar lines, the DMCA has no provisions for the fair use
of copyrighted material. The copyright act has long recognized that
there are situations where a copyright can be infringed with impu-
nity. 104 Digital material that contains technological measures to pre-
vent copying cannot be used pursuant to copyright fair use provisions.
The DMCA makes any use, fair or not, illegal. Although it is true that
a library or educational institution may possess copyrighted material
where the copy protection has been compromised, that is only for the
limited purpose of determining whether to acquire the work. It is still
illegal for the institution to circumvent the protections, which leads to
the catch-22 that it may possess the material after the illegal activity is
completed, but cannot partake in the illegal activity. Although the
DMCA affirms the fair use of copyrighted material, 105 there are no
accommodations for obtaining a work for fair use. Therefore, the
traditional fair uses in the Copyright Act cannot apply to protected
digital material.
Perhaps the amendment to the DMCA proposed by Rep.
Boucher will resolve some of these problems. The DMCRA proposes
two significant changes relating to copyright fair use. First, it would
104 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
105 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1).
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amend the law to specify that using a circumventing technology is not
a violation of the DMCA if it does not result in a copyright infringe-
ment. Second, it re-establishes the principals of Sony v. Universal City
Studios by allowing the manufacture and distribution of circumven-
tion technology if there is a significant non-infringing use. These are
positive steps towards correcting the problems inherent in the DMCA,
but they only address a small portion of the DMCA and still must
make the long trek through Congress before becoming part of the
copyright statutes.
One unintended side effect of the DMCA became clear in the
Felten case where the RIAA threatened to sue Professor Felten if he
revealed his research on circumvention of the SDMI. Not only does
this lead to serious issues of prior restraint, but also effectively pro-
vides judicial enforcement of corporate trade secrets. The SDMI was
a trade secret of the RIAA. There was no intent to patent the tech-
nology since this would publicly disclose the technology and render it
useless. Similarly, the SDMI code was not copyrighted nor was there
intent to copyright the code for the same reason. In fact, the threat
against Professor Felten does not stem from his disclosing the SDMI
code, rather Professor Felten intended to show how to bypass the
SDMI protections. If the actions of the RIAA had not been made
public, they would have successfully restrained Professor Felten from
disclosing the secrets of the SDMI. Consequently, RIAA would have
succeeded in protecting its trade secret - SDMI - through the threat
of a lawsuit based on the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions.
There are no easy resolutions to this problem. Prior restraint
could be considered reasonable in view of the ramifications in disclos-
ing this type of information. However, when the prior restraint is pro-
tecting a corporate trade secret, it becomes less reasonable. This issue
may become lost within the other more obvious problems with the
DMCA, yet it is another example of what critics point to as a bias
toward corporate copyright holders and away from individuals who
are not intending to run afoul of the DMCA.
B. Title II - Safe-harbor
Title II codifies a badly needed safe harbor for service providers
such as ISPs. Prior to the enactment of Title II, service providers
could be held liable for acts of copyright infringement committed by
users of the service provider's computers. That would be tantamount
to banks being held liable to the victim of a purse snatching because
the thief deposited his ill-gotten gains with the bank.
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When applying Title II, the courts have not only classified service
providers as those who simply offer access to the Internet, but have
also included those parties offering other online services. As a result,
the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA potentially cover traditional
brick and mortar businesses that offer services through the Internet,
along with ISPs. 10 6 The courts have not addressed the situation where
businesses have added online services to their core businesses - such
as airlines - but, taken to the extreme, those industries will also fall
under the DMCA's safe harbor protections in some manner. The
question the courts will have to grapple with is how far to extend the
safe harbor protections. Would a traditional company be liable for
maintaining infringing material on its web site if the site also has an
online catalog of its products? Arguably, the catalog is an online ser-
vice that the business is providing to its customers; therefore it can be
considered a service provider under the DMCA. Then, is it too far to
say that simply maintaining a presence on the World Wide Web is
tantamount to providing the service of giving information about a bus-
iness - commonly referred to as advertising - and therefore the busi-
ness is not liable for copyright infringement on its web site?
Obviously, this is not what Congress intended, and the courts should
not interpret the DMCA so broadly. Rather, the courts should limit
the scope of "service provider" such that the online service is an inter-
active service not just one that provides information. Although, a ser-
vice provider need not offer the complete set of services of an ISP, it
should be more than just a passive disseminator of information on a
website. Further, the courts should narrow the scope of the safe har-
bor protections to infringing activity relating only to the online ser-
vice. This would prevent a business from claiming protection from
liability when the infringing activity is completely unrelated to the ser-
vice being provided.
Courts have been inconsistent regarding what is substantially
conforming notification. Congress gave the courts some room to de-
termine what is required of the notice provisions in 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c)(3). This area of confusion allows the courts to decide for
themselves how much notice is enough. The result is that two courts
could come to different conclusions based on the same set of facts, as
was seen in ALS Scan and eBay. In both cases, incomplete notice was
given, however one court found it to be substantially conforming to
the law while the other found the notice to be insufficient. In fact, in
eBay, where the court found that the notice did not substantially fol-
106 Examples of this include Amazon.com, which has brought a traditional bookstore to
the Internet, and eToys.com which has done the same thing with a toy store.
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low what was required, the court admitted there would be circum-
stances where the amount of notice given would be sufficient. The
courts must develop a standard to consistently determine when notice
is proper so the infringed parties will know what and how much infor-
mation must be included for proper notice. A firm definition would
also prevent courts from being accused of bias when they should be
impartial.
The purpose of this article was to comprehensively review Titles I
and II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, looking at the
statutes and the relevant court cases interpreting the laws. Many of
the problems with the DMCA are fundamental to the purpose and
implementation of the Act. Some of these issues will be addressed by
legislators like Rick Boucher who are willing to take a stand that may
not be favorable on Capitol Hill. Others problems will be challenged
in the courts by people like Edward Felten, who are willing to risk
both civil and criminal penalties in the pursuit of what they feel to be
fair and just. And there will also be those like Dmitry Skylarov who
are the unintended protectors of copyright freedoms. As computers
and digital material become more prevalent in our society, a balance
must be found between protecting the rights of copyright owners and
the free transmission of copyrighted materials.
